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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
LARRIE GRANT PLYMEL, et a/.,
Plaintiffs,

v.
TEACHERS RETIREMENT SYSTEM
OF GEORGIA, et a/.,

Defendants.
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)(
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)(
)(
)(
)(

CIVIL ACTION
FILE NO. 2004-CV-84312

CLA

FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Counsel for the parties appeared at hearings held on October 4 and 5, 2007, and
January 16, 2008, to present oral argument and testimony in this case. After reviewing
the record of the case, the arguments and evidence presented during the hearings, and
the briefs submitted on the issues, the Court finds as follows:
1.

FACTS
The Plaintiffs (individually, "Class Members" or collectively, the "Class") are

retired educators who are members of the Teachers Retirement System of Georgia
("TRS"), the named Defendant in this action along with certain of its Trustees and Board
Members (collectively, the "Defendants"). At retirement, each Class Member elected to
participate in an optional retirement plan allowance, which pays a reduced monthly
allowance, first to the Member during her lifetime and then to a named beneficiary after
the Member's death. O.C.G.A. § 47-3-121. The optional plan benefits were calculated
using "option factors" based upon mortality tables adopted by TRS in 1983. TRS

adopted new option factors in 2003 applicable to retirees who retired after February 1,
2003, which resulted in increased benefits payable under the optional plan.
The optional plan is a reduced retirement benefit for the retired teacher with a
remaining benefit paid to a named beneficiary upon the teacher's death.

The new

mortality tables reflected a longer life expectancy, and, if applied to the optional plan
would have resulted in increased benefits. The longer the period of time that the
Member has to fund the beneficiary's remainder benefit, the cheaper the monthly
payments to purchase such benefit should be. Thus, as the life expectancy increased
with the new mortality tables, the Member had a longer period of time to purchase the
benefit, which resulted in smaller deductions from the Member's monthly benefit
amount.
TRS is governed by a complex statutory scheme provided in D.C.G.A. §§ 47-3-1,

et seq. Among the requirements established in the Code, is that the optional plan
allowance must be "actuarially equivalent" to the maximum plan allowance that the
Member could have chosen.
Plaintiffs filed this action in April 2004 alleging that TRS unlawfully used an
outdated mortality table to calculate participants' monthly benefits and deductions to
fund optional plan beneficiary benefits. The trial court granted summary judgment to
TRS, and Plaintiffs appealed.
The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that TRS was obligated to use the
mortality tables it adopted (and used with the maximum plan) for other retirees in 1982,
1986, 1992, 1996, and 2000 in calculating the deductions for the optional plan
participants, and reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to TRS. The
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case was remanded to the Fulton County Superior Court, and then transferred to the
Business Case Division of the Court, where it remains for final determination of the
remaining issues.

2.

THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT OPINION
Defendants urge the Court to interpret the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion in

Plymel v. Teachers Retirement System, 281 Ga. 409,637 S.E.2d 379 (2006), as
involving a simple issue of contract. Conversely, Plaintiffs contend that the Supreme
Court concluded that TRS violated its statutory obligations. The Court's opinion is clear
that Defendants, acting as public officials, are bound to the statutory obligations
established in O.C.G.A. §§ 47-3-1, et seq. governing the Teachers' Retirement System.
That duty included providing optional benefits that are "actuarially equivalent" to the
maximum plan benefits, and so TRS was "required to use the mortality tables it adopted
in 1982, 1986, 1992, 1996, and 2000 to determine actuarial equivalence." Plymel v.
Teachers Retirement System, 281 Ga. 409, 414 (2006). The case was remanded to
this Court to determine whether the optional-plan and maximum-plan benefits were
actuarially equivalent.
The Defendants were and are required by law to follow the directives of the
statute with respect to the use of mortality tables, and they have no discretion to do
otherwise. The Defendants do not dispute that they did not employ the correct mortality
tables in calculating benefits for Members of the Plaintiff Class, and that, as a result,
Class Members have received lower monthly benefit payments. In accordance with the
opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court in Plymel v. Teachers Retirement System, 281
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Ga. 409, the claims of the Plaintiff Class are resolved on their merits against the
Defendants and in favor of the Plaintiff Class. 1

3.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Consistent with the Supreme Court opinion in this case, the Court finds that the
Plaintiff Class' statutory claims form the basis of their recovery. This is not a case
involving a simple contract where a six-year statute of limitations would apply. In
Georgia Masonic Insurance Co. v. Davis, 63 Ga. 471 (1879), the estate of a deceased
member of an insurance association, formed in accordance with a Georgia statute, sued
for insurance proceeds and faced a statute of limitations defense. The question was
whether the deceased's rights were rooted in simple contract or statutory rights. Justice
Bleckley wrote, "[t]he deceased, in his life-time, planted a contract, and from that root
sprang up a statutory right, the measure of which is found in the charter and by-laws,
and to gather the fruits of that right the action is prosecuted. The purpose of the suit is
not to burrow after the contract, but to shake the tree which express enactment of the
law has made to grow out of it."

12.:. at 471.

Here, as in Georgia Masonic Insurance Co., each Class Member had an
individual contract which incorporated the statutory rights and obligations found in
O.C.G.A. §§ 47-3-1, et seq. The argument that this case is one of a simple contract is
erroneous. Not once during this litigation has a single teacher's contract been put into
evidence or reviewed by this Court. Instead, the focus of the last four (4) years of
litigation has been on the obligations and rights established in D.C.G.A. §§ 47-3-1, et

seq. See also, Pierce v. Rhodes, 208 Ga. 554 (1951).

Consistent with footnote 13 of the Supreme Court's opinion, the Court concludes that the claims
of the Plaintiff Class for constitutional violations are moot.
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Thus, pursuant to D.C.G.A. § 9-3-22, the Court finds the applicable statute of
limitations in this case to be twenty (20) years. ("All actions for the enforcement of
rights accruing to individuals under statutes ... or by operation of law shall be brought
within 20 years after the right of action has accrued ... ".) The Plaintiff Class asserts
rights accruing under D.C.G.A. §§ 47-3-1, et seq., and they assert claims for breach of
their individual contracts, which incorporated those statutes.
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For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Defendants' statute of limitations defense is GRANTED, and the applicable statute of
limitations is determined to be twenty (20) years.

4.

BREACH ACCRUAL FOR PURPOSES OF CALCULATING THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
Plaintiffs request this Court to find that the statute of limitations accrued on a

payment-by-payment basis. See Willis v. City of Atlanta, 265 Ga. App. 640, 645, (2004)
(applying the continuing violation doctrine and holding that each inadequate payment
constituted a breach). The contract in Willis and in other employment contexts,
however, is divisible because the periodic payment due is related to the work performed
during the relevant time period. Here, Plaintiffs worked as educators, contributed funds
to TRS, and, upon retirement, elected to receive a monthly payment plus a benefit
payable to a named beneficiary upon the educator's death. See,!ML., D.C.G.A. § 47-3121. Plaintiffs' rights accrued only after the educator earned a certain number of
service credits (typically 30 years' worth) and reached a certain age (typically 60 years

2

Although Defendants appeared to drop this argument during the final hearing on January 16,
2008, the Court will address the applicability of the two (2) year wage exception to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22.
The statute governing the calculation of retirement benefits owed by the Teachers Retirement System is
not a "law respecting the payment of wages and overtime," and the Members of the Plaintiff Class do not
seek to recover "wages" or "overtime" so that the two-year proviso of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 does not apply to
this case.
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old).

See,~,

§§ 47-3-101, 102, 120. Additionally, Plaintiffs fully performed all of their

obligations under their contracts before any performance was due by TRS. The Court,
therefore, finds that the contracts at issue here are not traditional severable contracts as
were those addressed in Willis. Instead, the contracts at issue, in the context of
retirement benefits are entire contracts.
O.C.G.A. § 13-16-14, however, establishes an exception to the traditional rule
that only one action may lie for an entire contract. "[W]here breaches occur at
successive periods in an entire contract, an action will lie for each breach ... " (emphasis
added). See also, O.C.G.A. 13-1-9. The retirement allowance owed by TRS to the
Plaintiffs is defined as a benefit to be paid in "monthly installments." O.C.G.A. § 43-31(24). Additionally, TRS had the authority over time to adopt new mortality tables and
adjust monthly option payments. Thus, each month in which TRS failed to pay Plaintiffs
an actuarially equivalent benefit, TRS breached their contractual obligation to Plaintiffs.
See, generally Larkins, Ga. Contracts, § 4-12 (2007-2008). In accordance with the
foregoing analysis, the Court finds that the statute of limitations accrued on a paymentby-payment basis in this case consistent with O.C.G.A. § 13-6-14.

5.

PRE- JUDGMENT AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST
O.C.G.A. § 7-4-2 provides that the legal rate of pre-judgment interest is to be

seven percent (7%) "where the rate percent is not established by written contract."
O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12(b) provides that "[i]fthe judgment is rendered on a written contract or
obligations providing for interest at a specified rate the judgment shall bear interest at
the rate specified ... " or else shall be set at the default rate of prime plus three (3)
percent. O.C.G.A. § 47-3-24(b) provides that the TRS Board of Trustees " ... shall also
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determine from time to time the rates of regular interest for use in all calculations
required in connection with the retirement system limited to a minimum of 2 percent."
Defendants entered into the record TRS Board of Trustees Administrative Rule
513-5-1-.50, adopted on April 16, 1975, establishing four and one-half percent (4

~%)

as the regular interest rate for member accounts. Plaintiffs did not controvert this
evidence. The statutes and regulations governing TRS were incorporated into each
teacher's contract upon proper adoption. Defendants have demonstrated that the
applicable interest rate was determined by the TRS Board of Directors to be four and
one-half percent (4~%) and it shall be the rate of pre-judgment and post-judgmene
interest applicable in this case in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 7-4-2 and § 7-14-12(b).
See,~,

Chilivis v. Rogers Oil Co., 135 Ga. App. 176, 176 (1975).

Post-judgment interest on all principal amounts owed by the Defendants shall run
from the date of entry of this Final Order and Judgment at the rate of four and one-half
percent (4~%). As to post-judgment interest, should the Plaintiffs choose to appeal
any of the holdings of this Court and appeal is not taken by Defendants, post-judgment
interest will not begin to accrue until the date of final judgment on appeal.

6.

CLASS REPRESENTATIVE PAYMENTS
Class Representatives, Larrie Grant Plymel and Corinne Monroe are each

awarded an amount equal to $75,000.00, as incentive payments in light of their having
brought this action and served as active Class representatives throughout its pendency.
These payments are in addition to any monies owed to them by TRS by virtue of their
being members of the Plaintiff Class. The payments shall be deducted from the Fees
Plaintiffs and Defendants both concede that this action involves "a judgment for a sum certain, or
for an amount mathematically determinable ... " McClure v. Raper, 277 Ga. 642, 644 (2004) (quoting
Brown v. Brown, 265 Ga. 725, 727(1995)).
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Fund established in Paragraph 8 of this Order and shall be paid by TRS within thirty
(30) days of the date of this Final Order and Judgment.

7.

PLAINTIFF CLASS PAYMENTS
As previously set forth in this Order, the prevailing Plaintiff Class is limited to

include only those optional retirees, beneficiaries of optional retirees and/or the heirs of
any deceased retiree/beneficiary whose claims arose within the twenty (20) year statute
of limitations window as calculated on a per-payment breach, through February 1, 2003,
the date on which the TRS Board of Trustees applied "actuarially equivalent" benefits
for optional retirees.
To these Plaintiffs, TRS is responsible for "back-pay" which consists of the
difference between (a) the principal amounts that would have been paid to optional plan
retirees and beneficiaries of optional plan retirees4 during the twenty (20) years before
the filing of this action if the Defendants had calculated their retirement benefits using
the correct mortality tables and (b) the principal amounts actually paid to such retirees
and beneficiaries.
The Defendants are also responsible to the Plaintiff Class for prejudgment
interest at the rate of four and one-half percent (4%%) per annum calculated on each
monthly component of the principal amounts owed. The Defendants are also required
to adjust the future retirement benefits payable to the Members of the Plaintiff Class
who are presently receiving or may receive retirement benefits so that those benefits be
calculated using the correct mortality tables.

4

The phrase "optional plan retirees" includes those persons who chose an optional plan retirement
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 47-3-121.
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8.

COMMON FUND
This Court, in a separate Attorneys' Fees Order has awarded thirty percent

(30%) of the common fund as the Fees Fund from which attorneys' fees, expenses of
this litigation, and incentive payments to Class Representatives are to be paid. In
addition, TRS is directed to allocate to the Fees Fund any payments already made by
TRS pursuant to Paragraph 12 of the Court's Order of October 22,2007, concerning
payments for notice to the Class, and any future notice-related expenses.
The common fund is the sum of the following amounts:
A.

All principal amounts, calculated as provided herein, that TRS failed

to pay to optional plan retirees who retired at any time on and between August 1,
1983, and January 31, 2003, and whose retirement benefits were based on an
incorrect mortality table. These principal amounts shall be calculated for the
period beginning April 8, 1984, and ending sixty (60) days after the entry of this
Final Order and Judgment (the "Calculation Period"). These principal amounts
shall be the difference, calculated on a person-by-person basis, between (i) the
retirement benefits properly payable to such persons during the Calculation
Period, calculated using the correct mortality table in accordance with the
Supreme Court's decision of October 30, 2006, and adjusted for cost of living
and any other increases granted and applied during the Calculation Period; and
(ii) the retirement benefits paid in fact to such persons during the Calculation
Period.
B.

All principal amounts, calculated as provided herein, that TRS failed

to pay to named beneficiaries of optional plan retirees, which named
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beneficiaries began to receive at any time on and between August 1, 1983, and
January 31,2003, and whose benefits were based on an incorrect mortality table
as ruled by the Supreme Court of Georgia. These principal amounts shall be
calculated for the Calculation Period. These principal amounts shall be the
difference, calculated on a person-by-person basis, between (i) the retirement
benefits properly payable to such persons during the Calculation Period,
calculated using the correct mortality table in accordance with the Supreme
Court's decision of October 30, 2006, and adjusted for cost of living and any
other increases granted and applied during the Calculation Period; and (ii) the
retirement benefits paid in fact to such persons during the Calculation Period.
C.

Pre-judgment interest at the rate of four and one-half percent

(4%%) per annum on each monthly component of the principal amounts
calculated under the foregoing Paragraphs 8(A) and 8(8);

pr~vided,

however,

that the rate of interest on such components shall change to the post-judgment
interest rate for the period after entry of this Final Order and Judgment, or, after
an appeal consistent with Paragraph 6 of this Order.

D.

The difference between (i) the present value of all future retirement

benefits expected to be paid (a) to optional plan retirees who retired at any time
on and between August 1, 1983, and January 31, 2003, and (b) to named
beneficiaries of optional plan retirees, which named beneficiaries began to
receive benefits at any time on and between August 1, 1983, and January 31,
2003, all calculated using the correct mortality tables in accordance with the
Supreme Court's decision of October 30, 2006; and (ii) the present value of all
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future benefits expected to be paid to such persons if the Supreme Court's
decision of October 30, 2006 had affirmed rather than reversed the trial court's
Order of January 9, 2006. These calculations shall be performed on a personby-person basis using sixty (60) days after the date of this Final Order and
Judgment as the present value date, and the calculations shall employ a discount
rate of seven (7) percent.

9.

DEFENDANTS' OBLIGATIONS
The Defendants are ORDERED and ENJOINED to do and specifically perform

the following in order to remedy their violation of the rights of the Members of the
Plaintiff Class, to prevent further injury to Members of the Plaintiff Class, and to carry
out their statutory duties to the Members of the Plaintiff Class:

A.

Within one hundred and twenty (120) days of entry of this Final

Order and Judgment, TRS shall calculate all amounts under Paragraphs 8(A),
8(8), 8(C), and 8(0) of this Final Order and Judgment and shall provide its
calculations to Class Counsel. 5 Class Counsel shall have fifteen (15) days after
receipt of the calculations within which to notify TRS that they dispute any of
these calculations. Class Counsel shall promptly submit any such dispute to the
Court for resolution.
8.

Within ninety days (90) days of entry of this Final Order and

Judgment, TRS shall make available to Class counsel and to actuaries
designated by Class counsel all information and figures necessary to perform

5

If any retiree or beneficiary for whom calculations are to be performed dies within the sixty (60)
day period following entry of this Final Order and Judgment, the Defendants may adjust their calculations
for such a retiree or beneficiary in light of that fact.
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calculations pursuant to Paragraph 9(A) of this Final Order and Judgment,
including but not limited to:
i.

All mortality tables adopted by TRS' trustees from 1982

through and including January 31, 2003;
ii.

All option factors applied, including the time period of their

application, in calculating optional plan retirement benefits at any time
during the period beginning August 1, 1983, and continuing to and through
January 31, 2003;
iii.

All option factors calculated for use in re-calculating optional

plan retirement benefits in the period beginning August 1, 1983 in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in this case;
iv.

All cost of living and other adjustments applied and used at

any time since August 1, 1983, for any person receiving optional plan
retirement benefits, including the period of application of each such
adjustment;
v.

The maximum plan retirement benefit that would have been

available to each optional plan retiree for whom calculations are to be
performed under Paragraph 9(A) of this Final Order and Judgment or for
whose beneficiary calculations are to be performed under Paragraph 9(A)
of this Final Order and Judgment;
vi.

The optional retirement plan chosen by or for each optional

plan retiree or beneficiary of an optional plan retiree for whom calculations

12

are to be performed under Paragraph 9(A) of this Final Order and
Judgment;
vii.

All payments (and dates of payments) made in fact by TRS

to each optional plan retiree or beneficiary of an optional plan retiree for
whom calculations are to be performed under Paragraph 9(A) of this Final
Order and Judgment; and
viii.

Such other documents and things as are reasonably

requested by counsel for the Plaintiff Class, which relate to TRS'
recalculation and payment of benefits in accordance with the decision of
the Supreme Court in this case.
TRS may supplement their disclosures up to one hundred and twenty (120) days
of entry of this Final Order and Judgment.
C.

TRS shall, within fifteen (15) days of notification by Class Counsel

that they do not dispute calculations as provided in Paragraph 9(A) of this Final
Order and Judgment, pay to those Members of the Plaintiff Class who are living
retirees or beneficiaries the individually calculated amounts owed to them under
Paragraphs 8(A), 8(8), and 8(C), minus the percentage figure allocated by the
Court's separate Order to pay attorneys' fees, expenses of this litigation and
incentive payments ("Attorneys' Fees Order"), and minus any required tax
withholding for each such Class Member; provided, however, that if Class
Counsel dispute any calculation, TRS shall, within fifteen (15) days of notification
by Class Counsel of the dispute, pay any amount that is not disputed.
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o.

TRS shall, within fifteen (15) days of notification by Class Counsel

that they do not dispute calculations as provided in Paragraph 9(A) of this Final
Order and Judgment, adjust all future payments to those Members of the Plaintiff
Class who are living retirees or living beneficiaries of deceased retirees as of the
next payment due after such notification by Class Counsel. The adjustments
shall be in the amounts of the differences calculated under Paragraph 8(0) of this
Final Order and Judgment (without any reduction to present value), minus the
percentage figure allocated by the Court's Attorneys' Fees Order, with such
additional amounts to be paid month-to-month in addition to the regularly paid
benefit until such time as the retiree dies or is otherwise no longer entitled to
receive a benefit; provided, however, that if Class Counsel dispute any
calculation, TRS shall, within fifteen (15) days of notification by Class Counsel of
the dispute, adjust all future payments as of the next payment due after such
notification by Class Counsel to the extent of any amount that is not disputed.
E.

If because of the passage of time in connection with payment of

amounts owed as calculated under Paragraphs 8(A), 8(8), and 8(C) of this Final
Order and Judgment and adjustment of future retirement benefits as calculated
under Paragraph 8(0), a gap is created such that one or more months of
increments due is not paid, then TRS shall promptly make such payments to the
Members of the Plaintiff Class to whom such payments are due.
F.

Within thirty (30) days of entry of this Final Order and Judgment,

TRS and Class Counsel shall, with the assistance of The Garden City Group,
Inc., develop and submit for the Court's review and approval a procedure by
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which the legal representatives of deceased retirees and deceased named
beneficiaries of deceased retirees may claim funds calculated to be owed under
Paragraphs 8(A), 8(8), and 8(C) above. Such procedure shall make use of the
information obtained through the mailed and publication notice process provided
for in this Court's Order of October 22,2007, shall provide reasonable assurance
that these representatives are legally authorized to receive the funds, and shall
be administered promptly by The Garden City Group, Inc., with opportunities for
review and input by both the Defendants and Class Counsel. The amounts due
to such representatives shall be reduced by the percentage figure allocated by
the Court in the separate Attorneys' Fees Order, and by any required tax
withholding for each such Class Member. If any dispute shall arise as to the
qualifications of a person who claims to be a representative under this
subparagraph, such dispute shall be promptly referred to the Court for resolution.
H.

TRS shall, within fifteen (15) days of notification by Class Counsel

that they do not dispute calculations as provided in Paragraph 9(A) of this Final
Order and Judgment, pay thirty percent (30%) of the common fund to the Fees
Fund as provided for in the Court's separate Attorneys' Fees Order; provided,
however, that if Class Counsel disputes any of the calculations, TRS shall, within
this same time period, pay to Class Counsel any amount that is not disputed.
I.

TRS shall, within sixty (60) days of the date of this Final Order and

Judgment, pay to Class Counsel from the Fees Fund allocated by the Court's
Attorneys' Fees Order $233,539.45 for reasonable expenses already incurred.
TRS shall also set aside from the Fees Fund $30,000.00 for additional actuarial
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service expenses and $60,000.00 for additional class administration costs that
Class Counsel have shown that they reasonably expect to incur in the course of
implementation of this Final Order and Judgment (together the "Expense SetAside"). Within fifteen (15) days of TRS' receipt of invoices, bills, or other
reasonable documentation of expenses incurred by Class Counsel as described
in this paragraph, TRS shall reimburse Class Counsel for such amounts from the
Expense Set-Aside. Such Expense Set-Aside payments may be made before
the Fees Fund is released to Class Counsel. At the time of payment of the Fees
Funds to Class Counsel, any unused Expense Set-Aside amounts shall be
reassigned to the Fees Funds and distributed according to the terms of this Final
Order and Judgment and the separate Attorneys' Fees Order, issued herewith.
J.

TRS shall, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Final Order and

Judgment, pay to The Garden City Group, Inc., from the Fees Fund allocated by
the Court by the separate Attorneys' Fees Order, any remaining unpaid amount
of its reasonable expenses incurred in connection with implementation of the
Court's Order of October 22,2007, and any reasonable expenses anticipated to
be incurred in the course of implementing Paragraph 9(F) of this Final Order and
Judgment. The Court hereby authorizes TRS to reimburse The Garden City
Group, Inc. from the Fees Fund within fifteen (15) days of TRS' receipt of
invoices, bills, or other reasonable documentation for its reasonable expenses
thereafter incurred in such implementation, up to $100,000.00 without further
order of the Court. If, at the time for distribution of the Fees Fund to Class
Counsel, there are still outstanding, unpaid expenses of The Garden City Group,
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Inc., the Fees Fund may be distributed to Class Counsel in accordance with the
terms of this Final Order and Judgment and the separate Attorneys' Fees Order
issued herewith, provided that, Class Counsel are responsible for paying any
such remaining expenses.

10.

UNCONTESTED CLAIMS
The Court has issued a separate Order regarding the early payment of

uncontested claims.
SO ORDERED, this

;29

day of ~

(nP\,

2008.

Alice D. Bonner, Senior Judge
Superior Court of Fulton County
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Copies to:
Richard H. Sinkfield, Esq.
Rogers & Hardin LLP
2700 International Tower
229 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30303-1602
(404) 420-4605
Thurbert Baker, Esq.
Annette Cowart, Esq.

Hardy Gregory, Jr., Esq. Of Counsel
David A. Forehand, Jr., Esq.
Davis, Forehand & Lawson
P. O. Box 5005
Cordele, GA 31010
(229) 271-9323

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

40 Capital Square, SW
Atlanta, GA 30334
(404) 651-3380
Bryan Webb, Esq., Special Assistant
Attorney General
233 E. Broad Street
P.O. Box 1884
Athens, Georgia 30603
(706) 546-1395

Bobby Lee Cook, Esq.
Cook & Connelly
9899 South Commerce Street
P. O. Box 370
Summerville, Georgia 30747
(706) 857-3421
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